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Volume 34 Summer 1999 Number 4
SYMPOSIUM
INTRODUCTION: THE LIFE AND LEGACY OF
BERNARD SCHWARTZ*
The Honorable Robert H. Henry'
I first met Bernard Schwartz in the most fortunate of accidents. Dean John
Makdisi, always the gentleman scholar, had invited me to drive over from Oklahoma
City University to hear a visiting heavy-weight, the dean of one of our finest national
law schools, who was to speak here at Tulsa.
I attended, and frankly, was a bit bored with the speech. Perhaps the visiting
dean, a noted scholar, was not at his best that day. More likely, he had dusted off an
old presentation that he had not bothered to update, feeling secure no doubt-having
misconstrued his constitutional topic as jurisprudential-that his presentation was
therefore timeless. I was regretting the time investment until after the address Dean
Makdisi introduced the law school's new Chapman Professor of Law, and asked if
he had anything to add.
A year or so later, I would hear Bernard Schwartz, as he spoke at my invitation
in Oklahoma City, describe Justice Rehnquist when he first came on the court as a
Hushpuppy-loafer-wearing, sweater clad, thick spectacled chap who looked like a
small town college math professor.! Well, as Professor Schwartz rose that day in
Tulsa, I also saw and felt the persona of a college math professor, but it was a certain
* The introduction of this tribute is based on remarks delivered at the Memorial Service Celebrating the Life and
Legacy of Bernard Schwartz, Monday, February 23, 1998, The University of Tulsa Sharp Chapel, in 33 TuLSA L.J.
1048 (1998).
t Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; formerly Dean and Professor of Law, Oklahoma
City University College of Law, 1991-94; Attorney General of Oklahoma, 1987-91.
1. Bernard Schwartz, 1994 Quinlan Lecture, Not How the Grinch Stole Christmas, but How Chief Justice
Rehnquist Almost Stole Roe v. Wade, Oklahoma City University School of Law.
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well-known German mathematician/physicist who retired to Princeton. Rising
slowly, as he thought how best to diplomatically say what needed to be said, our
jurisprudential unified field theorist began: "Well,-I, uh,-I think the dean is
knocking on a door that has been closed for a very long time.... ." And then, in a
deluge of rapid-fire, impromptu sentences that had in fact been constructed by a
lifetime of thinking about the topic, Professor Schwartz demonstrated the fallacies of
pure originalism, and punctuated his argument with the easiest-to-understand example
he could find of its shortcomings: the "coinage' clause of Article 1, Section 8, cl. 5,
of our Constitution which clearly grants Congress the power "To coin Money, [and]
regulate the Value thereof."
Professor Schwartz proceeded to explain that, unlike so many other clauses, the
intent of the framers as to the exact meaning of that clause was crystal clear (not so
clear to Professor Schwartz was probably whether they intended their intent to control
and for how long). "Coin" did not mean "print," and specie, good, hard, metallic
money was what everyone had in mind, especially after the disasters of paper money
during the Revolutionary War. He went on to quickly explain the rise of paper
currency in the Civil War era, and the disaster that resulted when the Court put in its
two bits worth by trying to enforce the constitutional norm.2 In a fraction of the time
taken by the visiting dean, the new professor had more convincingly made the case.
He sat down to a moment of awed silence at the effectiveness of his unprepared
remarks, and then a round of generous and genuine applause followed.
Later I would read this same lesson in the Master's printed word:
A basic document, drawn up in an age of knee-breeches and three-cornered hats,
can serve the needs of an entirely different day only because our judges have
recognized the truth of Marshall's celebrated reminder that it is a constitution they
are expounding-an instrument that could hardly have been intended to endure
through the ages if its provisions were fixed as irrevocably as the laws and the
Medes and Persians.' The constantly evolving nature of constitutional doctrine has
alone enabled our system to make the transition from the eighteenth to the
twentieth century.4
This was the basic constitutional teaching of Bernard Schwartz. He was an
instrumentalist in the Hamiltonian sense, and in the Holmesian sense. His jurispru-
dential sympathies were with the Yankee from Olympus. He wrote:
2. Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. 603 (1869), overruled by The Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457 (1870).
3. The reference is to the use in Judeo-Christian holy writ to the inflexible, unchangeable laws of the Medes and
the Persians. See Daniel6:8, 12, 15 (The New Oxford Annotated Bible 1977) ("Now, 0 king, establish the interdict
and sign the document, so that it cannot be changes, according to the law of the Medes and the Persians, which cannot
be revoked." Daniel 6:8). This inflexible order resulted, to the dismay of the King who drafted it, in the casting of the
prophet Daniel into the firey furnace. See Daniel6. Professor Schwartz had an ancient clay tablet containing law from
this region and era, which he showed me at my first visit to his home.
4. BERNARD ScHwART4 TE NEw RIGHTr AND ThE CONSITItON: TURNING BACK THE LEGAL CLOCK 264-65
(1990).
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When Holmes asserted in his Common Law, "The life of the law has not been
logic; it has been experience," and that the law finds its philosophy in "consider-
ations of what is expedient for the community concerned," he was sounding the
clarion oftwentieth-centuryjurisprudence. If the law reflected the "felt necessities
of the time," then those needs rather than any theory should determine what the
law should be.5
But his call was for a law that was "flexible in the joints, not amorphous.
Law was a principled activity based upon legal principles. Holmes was instrumental,
but he was also restrained. Rights, "felt necessities," and human dignity were all
encompassed by the "living traditions"7 that even the paradigmatic conservative
Justice John Harlan described as our American legacy. But along with these were
legal principles, including restraint, and above all values. The major problem for
modern jurisprudence, he would often remind, is the resolution of Roscoe Pound's
antimony: "Law must be stable and yet it cannot stand still."'
Professor Schwartz would sharply criticize jurisprudential schools that were not
grounded in stable principles of law. He would describe Critical Legal Studies as
"academic nihilism" and observe that "Karl Marx still lives in only one place: the
American Academy."9 And, offering advice to feminist and critical race theorists, he
would caution the abandonment of notion of objectivity upon which our law has been
based.
It may be questioned [he said] whether women and minorities do not have the most
to lose if objectivity is no longer an essential legal desideratum. Those who urge
that objectivity should give way to "a more subjective, emotional legal rhetoric"
may think they are advancing a just and noble end. Ultimately, however, they do
no service to their cause or the women and minorities they profess to represent.
One may modify what Justice Black once said of efforts to supplant legal process
by coercive tactics in favor of minorities, "[Objective] law ... is too precious, too
sacred, to bejeopardizedby subjecting [the law to subjective standards] that have
been fatal to individual liberty and minority rights wherever and Whenever such
practices have been allowed to poison the streams of justice."'0
And, as to values, he would close his magnum opus with the words of John Paul
II, who warned that if there are no ultimate values
to guide and direct ... activity, then ideas and convictions can easily be
manipulated for reasons of power. As history demonstrates, a democracy without
5. BNA ScHwARTZ, MAi CURRES INAMmucANLaaALTHoUGHr394 (1993).
6. The phrase is really Judge Richard A. Posner's. See RICHARD A. PosNER,OvERcoMNG LAW 244-45 (1995);
RICHARD A. PoSNER, THE PROBLEMS OFJURISPRUDENCE 238 (1990).
7. The quote was, "That tradition is a living thing." Poe v. Ulhman, 367 U.S. 497,543 (1961).
8. ROSCoE POuD, NrOzpm OmS oF LEGAL HSORY 1 (1967).
9. See MANCupymNS, supra note 5, at 604.
10. Id. at 623.
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values easily turns into open or thinly disguised totalitarianism."
Professor Schwartz concluded: Ultimately, a law without values is an oxymoron that
cannot stand.1
2
But even though Professor Schwartz was an advocate of his Holmesian
Hamiltonianism, he was more than that, a philosopher in search of a dialogue. He
thought all respectable schools of thought should be invited to the table to participate.
He battled frequently with Judge Posner over the judge's advocacy of the economist's
cost-benefit analysis to legal questions that he thought it ill-suited for-like
procedural rights. But he confided with admiration that Posner was the most
influential and contributing jurist of this day.
As Tony Mauro wrote in The Legal Times, "When someone dies at the age of
74, the sadness felt by friends and admirers is sometimes tempered by the knowledge
that the person lived a full life... but when... Bernard Schwartz... died the...
shock was akin to the type of jolt following the death of someone much younger,
someone in the prime of his or her most productive years."' 3 The reason that shock
was felt was because it was true. Professor Schwartz was truly in his prime, and in
a place he loved, and in a place that adored him.
We will miss his sauntering through the hallway in stocking feet; the amazing
connections he would find between the law and Dr. Seuss, Dick the Butcher, or David
Letterman; his lively articles that could make administrative law minutiae seem part
of our "living traditions"; his classroom performances, his lunching with colleagues,
his dropping his important writing to chat with a student. He had so much more to
say to us, so much more "fragmented jurisprudence" to repair. We are grateful
indeed to Dean Belsky for his diligent work to gather, compile, and complete all that
he can.
Professor Schwartz and I talked at some length a few days before the tragedy.
He called to tell me how much he had enjoyed my review of his Main Currents in
American Legal Thought.4 We talked about several things, and when I raised one
concern he told me that he had written a book on the subject in 1991 and if he could
find a copy, he would send it forthwith. My clerk met me in the parking garage the
day before Christmas to tell me the tragic news. I rushed into my office to call the
University and saw the book, which had arrived that morning, at the very top of my
mail stack.
All the books that Professor Schwartz gave me have special meaning. I am
pleased to say that the most expensive book of his is one that I bought. I read Main
Currents to brush up before my confirmation hearings. It was the best legal time I
have ever spent.
11. Id. at 643.
12. See id.
13. Tony Mauro, Remembering a Supreme Scholar, LEGAL TPre, January 15, 1998 at 8.
14. See Robert H. Henry, Catching the Jurisprudential Wave: Bernard Schwartz's Main Currents in American
Legal Thought, 33 TULSA L.J. 385 (1998).
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I must add that early on I asked Professor Schwartz to call me not "judge," but
"Robert." He refused, saying he always calls judges "judge." I suspect he made an
exception for his wife, but he would not except me. Which was just as well. I could
never bring myself to call him "Bernie," and, come to think of it, he never invited me
to.
In a chapter on his beloved friend, JusticeWilliamBrennan, Professor Schwartz
related how unceremonious and unassuming this "most influential associate justice
in Supreme Court history"'" was. He mused that Justice Brennan had once related
with awe how at a charity auction, someone bid several thousand dollars to have
lunch with him and Mrs. Brennan.
I am awed by the fact that I, like so many of you, often had the opportunity to
have lunch with Bernard Schwartz, the legal giant, the "Superprof," and it cost us
nothing. Although that door, like the topic of the speech where I fortuitously met
Professor Schwartz, is now closed to us, it will reopen every time we consult his
books or articles, and remember his devotion to his craft, to his friends and to his
students. Professor Bernard Schwartz is a permanent part of the "living traditions"
that make up American Law.
15. Bernard Schwartz, How Justice Brennan Changed America, in REAsoN AND PAssIoN: JUSTicEBRENNAN's
ENDunNGI LuEmcE 31 (E. Joshua Rosenkranz & Bernard Schwartz eds., 1997).
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